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SOVEREIGN SPREADS, MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY EVENTS: 
EVIDENCE FOR THE EU  
By José Diogo Beirão 
  
This study provides an empirical analysis on how the communication of 
economic policy conducted by the ECB and the European Commission 
affects the European bond market. For this purpose, it was collected a set 
of periodic news from the beginning of the Euro until 2013, related with the 
monetary and fiscal policy events. The results of the study show that 
sovereign spreads reflect three sources of risk, credit risk through economic 
activity and competiveness, liquidity risk and international risk. The 
monetary events play a role in the bond market and they seem to be 
anticipated. On the other hand, fiscal policy events related with the “arms” 
of the SGP do not have a key role in this context. 
 
1. Introduction 
In 1989 the European Council reinforced the Commitment of a progressive 
economic and monetary integration within the European Economic Community 
member states. To this purpose it was constituted a committee that was represented by 
Jacques Delors, at that time president of the European Commission. The main goal of 
this committee was to study and propose an optimal path to develop an economic and 
monetary union. The study resulted in the report named as “Delors report”, which 
projected a three step process in order to achieve the monetary and economic union. 
The three steps were constituted as followed.  
On step one, that started in the 1st of July of 1990, the targets were an increase 
of the economic convergence (price and exchange rate stability as well as sound public 
finances) between the member states, achieving total freedom of capital circulation, an 
increase in the co-ordination of central banks and free use of the European Currency 
Unit, which was created for accounting purposes in 1979 in the development of the 
European Monetary System. 
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Stage two started in the 1st of January of 1994, and projected the end of the 
Central Banks’s credit granting, an increase on the coordination of the monetary 
policies and stronger economic convergence. At this stage, it was created the European 
System of Central Banks, which presupposes the independence of the national Central 
Bank. In the preparation of the final step it was presented, in June of 1997, the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) (the main aim is the surveillance of the member states public 
finances) and the European Central Bank (ECB), which was founded in the 1st of June 
of 1998. 
The last stage was in the 1st of June of 1999, where the participants in the Euro 
fixed their exchange rates. The European System of Central Banks started to conduct a 
single monetary policy and the SGP was already fully implemented. 
In line with the literature1 this study provides some insight about the impact of 
fiscal and monetary policy events on the European Union (EU) sovereign bond market. 
For this purpose, it is conducted an event study collecting monthly data (from 1:1999 
until 12:2012) for 10 EU countries long-term government bond yield. 
The empirical analysis is done both in a panel data estimation and for a country-
by-country purpose we also use a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system of 
equations. According to the literature, a way to capture the effects of the events on the 
bond market is to consider the long-term government bond yield of a country vis-à-vis 
a benchmark. For the EU countries the German long-term yield is generally accepted 
as the benchmark. On the theoretical side, the control variables considered to explain 
the sovereign spreads were chosen to reflect essentially three features: Credit Risk, 
Liquidity Risk and International Risk aversion behavior. 
                                                        
1 See for example Afonso and Strauch (2007) or Andersson et al. (2009) 
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Some important results of this study can be outlined as follows: sovereign 
spreads reflect the three sources of risk, credit risk through economic activity and 
competiveness, liquidity risk and international risk. Monetary events are playing a role 
in explaining sovereign spreads and markets seem to anticipate these events. Fiscal 
policy events related with the SGP are generally non-significant. On the other hand, the 
ones related with the financial assistance programs not only are affecting the countries 
where these programs were implemented but also present spillover effects. 
This study is organized in five sections. After the introduction, section 2 gives 
a survey of the literature divided in the determinants of the sovereign spreads and the 
event studies, section 3 provides some insights about the monetary and fiscal policy 
conduction in the EU, section 4 presents some stylized facts about the data and 
variables, section 5 deals with the empirical analysis divided by panel estimation, SUR 
estimation and a further spillover effects study, finally section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Sovereign Spreads Determinants 
When studying sovereign spreads determinants, there are broadly three main 
drivers in the literature: a) credit risk b) liquidity risk and c) and international risk 
aversion. 
When referring to credit risk, one can relate to risk of default associated with 
countries that have no conditions to comply with their financial obligations. This type 
of risk is linked with the specific country macroeconomic fundamentals, such as the 
evolution of economic indicators and fiscal soundness. The rational is when a country 
suffers a considerable worsening of their macroeconomic fundamentals (an abrupt fall 
of GDP or a rapid deterioration of public finances) that may lead to a default situation. 
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Derived from the problem of default, two more types of risk can be associated to the 
general category of credit risk. First, a risk associated with the re-pricing of bonds, i.e. 
the bond price of a country that is suffering from worst macroeconomic fundamentals 
is expected to fall, as a result of the worsening of the buyers’ perception of the bond 
value. Second, a risk related with the rating agencies power, which can shape market 
perception of the bond value, through a country rating downgrade or a worsening of 
country economic outlook. 
The liquidity risk is associated with the ability of a bond to be sold or to be 
bought easily. The amount of newly traded bonds, national issuing policy and a liquid 
futures market (so that market participants can hedge their positions) are factors that 
will shape this type of risk. The common proxies to measure this type of risk are bid-
ask spreads or the ratio between the total debt that issuer holds and the total debt issued 
in the EU market. This type of risk is highly interconnected with the credit risk.  
The third type of risk, international risk aversion, is related with uncertainty. A 
high level of uncertainty tends to reduce the willingness of market participants to take 
risk. So, in times of great uncertainty one would expect a reallocation of investments 
from riskier assets towards safer assets, for example, a shift from the corporate bond 
market to the sovereign market, which is viewed as safer. A way to capture this effect 
can be done through a spread, such as between the yields of AAA US corporate bonds 
and the yield of the 10-year US government bonds or through indexes of the US stock 
market implied volatility. 
The literature on the determinants of the sovereign spreads has addressed both 
the pre-crisis period and the crisis period. 
In the group of studies covering the pre-crisis period there is some disagreement 
in the literature about the importance of the three sources of risk. 
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Evidence shows that credit risk is generally an important source of risk in this 
period. The macroeconomic fundamentals and the specific fiscal positions of the 
countries seem to be an important driver of spreads even after the EMU foundation 
(Afonso and Rault, 2010; Ardagna et al., 2004; Bernoth et al., 2004; and Codogno et al., 
2003). In the work done by Codogno et al. (2003) and Ardagna et al. (2004) the emphasis 
is on the fiscal position, the debt and deficit level, but Bernoth et al. (2004) pointed out 
that the main variable explaining the credit risk, more than government debt and the 
deficit level, is the debt service.  
The start of the EMU only gave more power to the debt service, since the other 
sources of risk such as the debt level have showed a convergence path towards the 
benchmark. In addition, the work done by the Afonso et al. (2012) and Arghyrou and 
Kontonikas (2012), in the pre-crisis period pointed out that markets did not seem to price 
the macro fundamentals with exception of the fiscal deficits. It appears that in the pre-
crisis period for the EU, markets where essentially focused on pricing credit risk based 
on the fiscal deficit, and the implementation of the SGP only gave more emphasis to 
the fiscal deficit targets as it is pointed out by Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012). 
In terms of the liquidity risk there is a disagreement in the pre-crisis literature. 
Afonso and Rault (2010), Favero et al. (2010) and Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) report 
the importance of this source of risk to explain sovereign spreads, while Codogno et al. 
(2003), is in disagreement, putting a higher weight in other risk sources. The lack of 
consensus continued with Favero et al. (2010), arguing that illiquidity is an additional 
source of risk since it creates transaction costs for investors who are holding less liquid 
securities, thus they should be compensated with a higher return given that they are 
bearing higher costs. Bernoth et al. (2004), for the period of the transition for the single 
currency, found out that after the euro implementation there was a great fall in the 
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importance of liquidity factors. The authors explained this evidence as a result of a 
higher financial integration within the EMU members. 
   In terms of international risk aversion for the pre-crisis period, Codogno et al. 
(2003), Favero et al. (2010), and Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) found evidence of an 
important role of this source of risk. Codogno et al. (2003) report that in some cases the 
international risk aversion is a function of a specific country debt level, so countries 
more indebted will be more exposed to this source of risk. 
For the period during the international financial crisis, there is a general 
consensus in the literature that the fiscal position of the countries is one of the main 
drivers of sovereign spreads (Afonso et al., 2012; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; 
Attinasi et al., 2009; Caceres et al., 2010; Haugh et al., 2009; Schuknecht et al., 2010; and 
Sgherri and Zoli, 2009). Afonso et al. (2012) and Caceres et al. (2010) argue that since 
the summer of 2007 markets have been continuously pricing bonds based on the basis 
of country specific macroeconomic fundamentals. This coincided with a reaction of 
investors known as “flight-to-quality” where the German Bund and some of the core 
European countries securities enjoyed a flux of capital arising from riskier securities.  
 Another agreement in the literature is related with the increased importance of 
the international risk aversion role (Afonso et al., 2012; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; 
Attinasi et al., 2009; Barrios et al., 2009; Caceres et al., 2010; Haugh et al., 2009; 
Schuknecht et al., 2010; and Sgherri and Zoli, 2009). As mentioned before, the 
international risk aversion arises with an increase in uncertainty and in periods of 
financial tightening as mentioned by Codogno et al. (2003). Haugh et al. (2009) 
conjectured that in the period before the financial turmoil a low level of international 
risk aversion was obscuring the importance of the countries fiscal positions. Barrios et 
al. (2009) and Haugh et al. (2009) found that there was a significant interaction between 
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the international risk aversion and macro fundamentals, amplifying the role of fiscal 
positions to explain spreads. 
2.2. Event Studies 
In this section, it is going to be presented some of the latest developments in 
event analysis available in the literature, which we divide in three major groups: 
macroeconomic events, monetary events and rating news. 
First, regarding macroeconomic events studies (Afonso and Strauch, 2007; Arru 
et al., 2012; and Andersen et al., 2005), there is a wide range of work done with different 
methodologies and goals. Arru et al. (2012) conducted a study including six countries 
from the EMU where the authors gauge about the impact of macroeconomic data 
releases from several macro-areas such as US, Japan and EU. Using weekly data for 
the period from 2005 until 2010, the treatment that the authors gave to the 
macroeconomic data released is an application of a method used by Balduzzi et al. 
(2001) and Andersen et al. (2005) where they compute the so called standardized news2. 
Their main findings are firstly a reaction by the sample countries, excluding Spain, from 
positive news in the US. Secondly, macroeconomic surprises on the Euro-area business 
cycle affect the volatility of the series for four of the six sample countries and these 
reactions are only captured by negative surprises. 
Andersen et al. (2005) have studied the impact of macro news releases in the 
prices from six different futures markets3 in EU and US. Using daily data with a time 
span from 1998 until 2002 for the EU and 1992 until 2002 for the US, they found that 
bad macroeconomic news, using the same standardized news method as Arru et al. 
                                                        
2 Given by the difference between the news released of some variable from some macro-area at some 
point in time minus the median value of the respective forecasts prevailing on financial markets and 
surveyed by Bloomberg. The result of this calculation it is divided by the historical standard deviation. 
 
3 That includes US Treasure Bonds, S&P500, FTSE 100 index, British 10-year Treasury note, DJ Euro 
Stoxx and Euro Bobl futures. 
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(2012), have a negative impact during contractions, which it is expected, but in times 
of expansion they have a positive impact. Moreover, they also found significant cross-
market and cross-country linkages, which points to the evidence of spillovers between 
equity markets from the EU and the US. Finally Afonso and Strauch (2007), assembled 
fiscal policy news released along the year 2002 and evaluated the impact of these news 
on the long-term bond market for 13 countries from the EU. Using daily data their main 
finding is that markets were not penalizing default risk premium as a consequence of 
the fiscal policy events. 
Second, on monetary policy events literature gives some important insights 
about how markets react to central bank’s monetary policy. For the Euro area, 
Andersson et al. (2009) and Bernoth and Hagen (2004) found evidence in the German 
long-term bond market and in EURIBOR futures market that agents predict well the 
ECB´s monetary policy, reflecting transparency in ECB´s monetary policy conduction. 
Ehrmannp and Fratzscherp (2002) made an empirical analysis during the foundation of 
the EMU and pointed out that markets went through a learning process about ECB´s 
monetary policy. In recent years the increased role of M3 and the price level in 
explaining interest rate on the Euro area, achieved levels very similar to Germany prior 
the EMU. This suggests that markets have a perception about the ECB´s monetary 
policy very similar to the Bundesbank’s policies. Attinasi et al. (2009) analyzed the 
beginning of the crisis, in the period between 31 July of 2007 and 25 March of 2009, 
and concluded that the main refinancing operations announcements had a positive 
contribution for the narrowing of the sovereign spreads in the Euro area. Interestingly, 
Brand et al. (2006), for the money market yield, found that expectations from monetary 
policy change considerably during ECB´s press conferences. These changes apparently 
have a significant impact on the medium to long-term interest rates and immediate 
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policy decisions only affect shorter-term maturities. Andersson (2007), compares the 
ECB and FED monetary policy and concludes that both US bond and stock markets 
react more to the FED´s monetary policy decisions than respectively the Euro area bond 
and stock market react to the ECB´s monetary policy decisions. 
Third, the literature about rating news for the Euro area presents evidence that 
there is a significant linkage between the long-term government bond market and rating 
revisions (Afonso et al., 2011; Afonso et al., 2012; Arezki et al., 2011; De Santis, 2012; 
Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009). Afonso et al. (2011) found evidence that not only 
rating announcements but also outlook revisions have an impact on the Credit Default 
Swaps (CDS) spreads. Afonso et al. (2011) and Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) 
reached the same result, concluding that sovereign downgrades seems to play a key role 
explaining the higher risk premium paid by the downgraded countries.  
In addition, rating announcements do not seem to be anticipated by sovereign 
spreads as Afonso et al. (2011) findings, but it seems to exist contagion from the lower 
rated countries to the other Euro-area countries (Afonso et al., 2011; Afonso et al., 
2012) and the source of this contagion seems to depend from which rating agency rated. 
The spillover effect seems to be stronger when the downgraded country is Greece 
(Afonso et al., 2012; De Santis, 2012) and the effect is particularly stronger on countries 
with weaker fiscal positions. 
 
 
3. Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the Context of the EU 
Since the European Monetary Union (EMU) foundation there was a 
centralization of monetary policy, conducted by the ECB in coordination with the 
national central banks with a clear mandate of achieving price stability. However fiscal 
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policy is still decentralized giving member states the ability to control their public 
expenditures and revenues. As mentioned, the introduction of the SGP gave a minimum 
quality standard to the fiscal framework of the member states. 
The SGP is divided in “two arms” and it is constituted by a set of rules. These 
arms are known as the preventive and the corrective arm. 
The preventive arm is constituted by the assessment of the programs that are 
annually delivered by the member states where there should be an outline of economic 
developments, macroeconomic evolution projections and the so called medium term 
budgetary objective (MTO). The MTO is defined in structural terms so it is cyclically 
adjusted, at some extent, filtered of temporary measures letting only the discriminatory 
ones account to this purpose. All member states have to present their MTO, which 
usually is updated at the end of three years. They should, as a reference value, achieve 
an annual evolution of 0,5% of the GDP in structural terms. 
The member states’ MTO should be based essentially on three features. The 
existence of a safety margin against the breaching of the 3% deficit benchmark, a 
sustainable path for the debt ratio without neglecting the impacts of an aging population 
and leave some room for budgetary maneuvers in the case of a public investment need. 
For the analysis of the MTO, the Commission considers an ex ante and an ex 
post assessment. 
In the context of the ex ante assessment the Commission has to consider if the 
MTO is appropriate in light of the minimum requirements, if the member state is at his 
MTO or is in the path towards it (taking in account the business cycle, the sustainability 
risk and if the assumptions on which the MTO is based are realistic). 
In the ex post assessment the Commission will evaluate, if enough effort 
towards the MTO was made against the benchmark (0.5% in structural balance of the 
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GDP). If the Commission considers that exists a significant deviation from the MTO, 
it will give a warning to the concerned member state and the ECOFIN Council will 
recommend a set of measures to converge to the MTO path. If a country is a member 
of the Euro area and does not comply with the ECOFIN Council recommendations it is 
obliged to make an interest-deposit of 0,2% of the GDP as a sanction. 
The corrective arm of the SGP works through the excessive deficit procedure 
(EDP) so the member states implement the necessary measures to correct the excessive 
deficit. 
The ECOFIN Council launches an EDP essentially on an ex post assessment 
once it is triggered by the breach of one of two benchmarks. A deficit above 3% of GDP 
or a government debt higher than 60% of GDP and it is considered that is not 
diminishing at the right rhythm (1/20th per year).  
A member state facing an EDP is given a dead line period of 6 months (3 months 
if there was a serious breach) to implement the recommended measures by the ECOFIN 
Council. At the end of the period the member state is evaluated. Based on the ability to 
implement the measures that have been recommended, the Commission and ECOFIN 
Council put the procedure on hold, or recommends a stepping up of the efforts. 
If the Commission and ECOFIN Council understands that no effective action 
has been made, than it is prepared new recommendations and is possible to set a new 
dead line. New sanctions can be made for the Euro area countries, the fine is 0,2% of 
the GDP and the countries that are receiving the cohesion funds may find them 
suspended. The EDP is abrogated once the excessive deficit is corrected. 
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4. Data and Variables 
4.1. Sovereign Spread Determinants 
As it was mentioned, this study uses a panel estimation including 10 EU 
countries: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece 
(GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL) and Portugal (PT). 
 The variables included to explain the long-term government bond yield spreads 
are the lags of 10-year government bond yield (spread), the industrial production 
growth index (gind), the real effective exchange rate (q), that were taken from the 
Eurostat web site, the expected government budget balance ratio (balance), the expected 
debt-to-GDP ratio (debt), which were collected from the European Commission twice 
a year seasonal forecasts, the 10 year government bond bid-ask spread (ba) that was 
provided by the ECB and the VIX (the logarithm of the S&P 500 volatility index) taken 
from Reuters. 
 The 10-year government bond yields, the industrial growth index, the real 
effective exchange rate and the VIX are monthly data. The expected government budget 
balance ratio and the expected debt-to-GDP are released in a biannually basis and 
transformed into monthly data by fixing their value during the six months until a new 
forecast is released. The bid-ask spread has a daily frequency and it is transformed into 
monthly data by taking the average of the corresponding month. 
 Following the literature, to construct the spread equation, the dependent variable 
chosen is the difference between the 10-year government bond yield of a given country 
and the benchmark that for the Euro area which is the 10-year government bond yield 
form Germany. 
 The growth of industrial production is employed as a difference to the 
benchmark. The goal of employing this variable is to measure the impact on spreads 
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from the evolution in the economic activity. So the expectation of a higher/lower 
economic activity has a negative/positive impact on the sovereign spreads.  
 The real effective exchange rate is in logs and also has a difference to the 
benchmark. This variable is associated with the credit risk and is used to weight the 
competitiveness of the countries. The rational is, when it is observed an/a 
increase/decrease in the real effective exchange rate, there is an/a 
appreciation/depreciation, so is expected a higher/lower sovereign spreads as 
demonstrated by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011). 
 The expected budget balance ratio and the expected debt-to-GDP are also in 
difference to the one of the benchmark country and they represent the one-year ahead 
fiscal positions’ forecast of the European Commission. The goal of using forecasts is 
to measure credit quality. So, a deterioration of the expected fiscal positions implies a 
higher risk. A better (worst) expected fiscal position implies lower (higher) risk to 
sovereign spreads, which will diminish (increase) accordantly. 
 The 10-year bid-ask spread is normally used to measure liquidity in the bond 
market. So a higher (lower) bid-ask spread is expected to increase (decrease) the 
sovereign spreads.  
 The VIX is a measure of international risk aversion, and an increase (decrease) 
in the VIX is associated with a request of higher (lower) returns from the government 
bonds and thus an increase (decrease) of the sovereign spreads. 
4.2. Monetary and Fiscal events: 
 To construct the monetary and fiscal events, we gathered 215 monetary events 
plus 288 fiscal events since January 1999 until December 2012, which gives a total of 
503 events. The variables are constructed by flag procedure assuming that there are two 
types of events, positive and negative events, which means that a positive (negative) 
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event may lead to a lower (higher) sovereign spread. Using monthly data, when there 
is a positive or a negative event on a given month we attribute the values -1 or 1 
respectively and 0 for the non-event months.   
 The monetary events where selected by collecting the interest rate policy 
announcements done by the ECB during the sample period.  
 
Table 1 - Monetary policy announcements 
 MRO LF DF 
Total number of events 215 215 215 
Total number of events evolving variations 37 36 34 
Positive variations 18 18 18 
Negative variations 19 18 16 
Nº of increases, 25bp 16 16 16 
Nº of decreases, 25bp 10 8 7 
Nº of increases, 50bp 2 2 2 
Nº of decreases, 50bp 8 8 7 
Nº of decreases, ≥75bp 1 2 2 
Note: MRO - Main Refinancing Operations; LF – Lending Facility; DF – Deposit Facility; bp – basis points. 
                   Source: European Central Bank 
 
 Table 1, describes the structure of the interest rate decision-making done by the 
ECB. Looking at the numbers one can understand two interesting features from the 
interest rate policy. First, the MRO is from the three policy interest rates the one  which 
the object of more variations and second, when implementing monetary policy 
decisions the ECB apparently is more parsimonious with increases of the three rates 
when compared to decreases. This effect is visible given that 88.9% of the upward 
changes represent increases of 25bp whereas only 11.1% represent increases of 50bp. 
For negative variations, 25bp reductions account for 52.6% of the cases and 50bp 
reductions represent 42.1% from total variations. We can conclude that the strategy of 
the ECB seems to be opting for more mitigated negative impacts in the financial system 
from an abrupt increase in the interest rates. On the other hand, when facing an 
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economic slowdown, a more aggressive strategy of letting interest rates fall quickly to 
inject liquidity in the financial system seems to have been adopted.  
The variable chosen to capture the monetary policy events will be the MRO and 
it will only be considered variations of this rate. Following Andersson et al. (2009) the 
yield to maturity of a representative bond can be decomposed, applying the Fisher 
decomposition principal, in the sum of the real interest rate, the expected average 
inflation (until the maturity of the bond) and a risk premium (that the investor asks in 
return for holding and bearing the risk associated to the asset).  Given this hypothesis, 
we expect that when the ECB communicates an increase (decrease) in the MRO, the 
yield for a particular bond to rise (fall) and thus, to the spread increase (decrease). This 
effect on spreads is true, supposing that the benchmark bond yield is less susceptible to 
the ECB announcements when compared to the other sample countries. There are a total 
of 37 events, where 18 of them were considered negative for sovereign spreads 
receiving value 1 and 19 of them considered positive to spreads receiving the value -1. 
 The fiscal policy events (see Tables A1, A2 and A3 in the Appendix) were 
assembled based on the EU fiscal surveillance mechanism and were taken from the 
European Commission website. As already described, the surveillance mechanism is 
based on the preventive and corrective arm. With the purpose of capturing the fiscal 
policy conduction in the EU the assembled events were divided in three groups. 
 One is related with the preventive arm where essentially, as the Appendix Table 
A1 highlights, is a set of events that is composed by press releases resulting from the 
Commission assessment of the stability and convergence programs. In the so called 
European semester, member states should present their stability and convergence 
programs until April of every year. The events gathered in our analysis cover the 
assessment done by the Commission, which evaluate the member states MTO’s and 
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gives country specific recommendations. In the sample period, for the 10 countries 
considered, there are a total of 15 events per country.        
 The second group which is linked with the corrective arm, is essentially 
composed by press releases related with the EDP´s that where implemented during the 
sample period (see Table A2). The EDP implementation in a member state normally 
starts with a press release with a first warning done by the Commission, alerting for a 
violation or a potential violation of the MTO. If the member state does not present 
measures to correct the imbalances or if the Commission believes that the presented 
measures are not ambitious enough, there is a press release informing that the 
Commission will proceed with the EDP. During the EDP the Commission gives a press 
release about the ability of the member state to implement the measures negotiated with 
the ECOFIN council and the Commission. At the end, if the necessary measures were 
implemented and the imbalances were corrected, there is a final statement where the 
Commission recommends to the ECOFIN council the abrogation of the EDP.  
 The final group of events is included in the fiscal policy events but is not related 
directly with the two arms of the SGP. The last group of events is associated with the 
financial assistance programs that were implemented in the countries that asked for 
financial rescue. The countries included in this group are Spain, Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal. 
Spain received financial assistance in July of 2012 where it was agreed on a line 
of credit of €100 billion, but it was only used around €41.4 billion for recapitalization 
of financial institutions and the Spanish asset management company (Sareb). 
In May of 2010 the Eurogroup agreed on the first financial assistance program 
to Greece, where €80 billion were provided through bilateral loans by the member states 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) participated with an additional €30 billion. 
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The second Economic adjustment program started in March of 2012, where the 
projected amount for the financial assistance until the end of 2014 is €164.5 billion, 
provided by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in co-ordinance with IMF.  
Ireland’s economic and adjustment program was formally agreed in December 
of 2010. The total financial assistance to Ireland amounted to €85 billion, of which, a 
part provided by Ireland’s Treasury and National Pension Reserve Fund (€17.5 billion) 
and the bulk via external support (€67.5 billion), from the EFSF, the IMF, from bilateral 
loans (UK, Sweden and Denmark) and from the European Financial Stability 
Mechanism (EFSM).  
In May of 2011 the Portuguese economic and stability program was negotiated 
between the Portuguese government, the ECB, the Commission and the IMF. The 
agreed amount for the financial assistance was €78 billion provided by the EFSM, EFSF 
and the IMF with €22.1 billion, €24.8 billion and €24.7 billion respectively. This group 
of events (see Table A3) comprises press releases related with the implementation and 
revisions of the different Economic Adjustment Programs of this set of countries. 
 To implement the flag procedure on fiscal events we attribute a rank based on 
the expectation that the impact of a particular event has on the sovereign spreads. An 
event can have one of three rankings: it can either be positive (+), negative (-) or 
inconclusive (#) (see Tables A1, A2 and A3).  According to the ranking the flag will 
assume the value -1 if the ranking is positive, the value 1 if the ranking is negative and 
zero if the ranking is inconclusive. 
 The attribution of the rankings is based essentially on the MTO benchmark 
values (for the group related with the surveillances arm of the SGP) and subjective 
criteria of key words. Other authors propose such subjective methods applied to the 
ECB introductory monthly bulletin (see Heinemann and Ullrich (2005), Rosa and 
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Verga (2005) Gies (2005) and Gerlach (2004). Some key words for the press releases 
about the assessment of the stability and convergence programs by the Commission can 
go from “structural measures announced in the program are appropriate and in line with 
the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines” for positive news and “the updated program is 
not fully in line with the essential requirement of the Stability and Growth Pact” for 
negative news. 
For the group related with the corrective arm events are essentially negative. 
When there is an announcement about the need to implement an EDP in a member state 
it is given a negative rank. During the assessment of the member state’s ability to 
implement the agreed measures, it can be ranked as negative or positive based on the 
country performance. When the Commission gives a press release suggesting the 
abrogation of the EDP to the ECOFIN council this is ranked as positive (an as 
contributing to reduce the yield spread). When dealing with the events related with the 
review missions in the financial assisted countries, news are in general positive, where 
the key words are “ the program is on track” or “ the government has reaffirmed the 
commitment to the program”. The only bad news for this group is press releases about 
the countries formal asking for financial assistance. 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1. Panel data estimation 
 For the panel data analysis, we have conducted two different types of 
estimations for the following specification: 
spreadit = β1 + β2spreadit-1 + β3gindit + β4qit + β5bait + β6balanceit + β7debtit + β8vixit + 
β9Decbt + β10Dedpit + β11Dcspit + β12Dfapit + uit .     (1) 
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 To account for a possible endogeneity problem between the dependent variable 
and the explanatory variables we used in addition to the simple Ordinary least square 
(OLS) estimator also a Two-stage least square (2SLS) method, both with fixed effects 
and cross section-weights which account for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity.  
Following the literature we have included on the right-hand side a lag of the 
sovereign spreads, since one has to account for the persistence that is inherent to the 
spreads. As mentioned by Afonso et al. (2012) the inclusion of the lagged spread is 
fundamental to avoid bias resulting from important omitted variables as Hallerberg and 
Wolff (2008) also pointed out, but the inclusion of the lagged spread can generate a 
different source of bias since this term can be correlated with the fixed effects (see 
Nickell, 1981).  
Nevertheless, as noted for instance by Hallerberg and Wolff (2008), the bias 
originated from the correlation effect gets smaller as the time span of the panel increases 
and for samples over 20 periods, this effect is very small. 
 The panel considered in our analysis covers the period 1:1999 to 12:2012, 
giving a time dimension of T=167 which is enough to suspect that there is no bias 
arising from the introduction of the lagged term.  
Regarding the variables used in the study, gindit and qit are the growth rate of 
industrial production and the real effective exchange rate which represent the 
macroeconomic fundamentals measuring internal economic activity as well as 
competitiveness. bait denotes the 10-year government bond bid-ask spread and is a 
proxy for bond market liquidity. balanceit and debtit denote the expected (forecasted) 
fiscal position. In order to avoid possible bias resulting from a potential correlation 
between these two variables, they are not included together in the estimations. vixit 
denotes the international risk aversion. Decbt, Dedpit, Dcspit and Dfapit are dummy 
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variables created to capture the events gathered. Decbt contains the events of monetary 
policy. Dcspit is capturing the events of the surveillance arm from the SGP. Dedpit is 
capturing the events of the corrective arm from the SGP. Dfapit is capturing the events 
related with the financial assistance programs.  
 
Table 2 – Modeling Sovereign Spreads Using OLS and 2SLS  
  OLS   2SLS   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
β1 -0.249 -0.391 -1.082** -1.781*** 
 (0.311) (1.077) (0.539) (0.545) 
sprit-1 0.957*** 0.959*** 0.962*** 0.968*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
gindit -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.087*** -0.082*** 
 (0.004) (0.016) (0.028) (0.027) 
qit 0.034 0.063 0.210* 0.355*** 
 (0.066) (0.231) (0.112) (0.116) 
bait 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
balanceit -0.002  -0.009**  
 (0.002)  (0.004)  
debtit  0.000  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
vixit 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.050*** 0.058*** 
 (0.008) (0.033) (0.019) (0.018) 
Decbt 0.014** 0.015** 0.049** 0.049** 
 (0.006) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) 
Dedpit -0.029* -0.029 -0.095 -0.034 
 (0.018) (0.067) (0.093) (0.092) 
Dcspit 0.004 0.006 -0.048 -0.068 
 (0.011) (0.044) (0.081) (0.075) 
Dfapit 0.448*** 0.450*** 0.137 0.118 
 (0.065) (0.090) (0.202) (0.192) 
Ajd-R2 0.979 0.978 0.976 0.976 
N 10 10 10 10 
T 167 167 167 167 
 Note: The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. The instrumental variables 
used are the second and third lags of spreads and the first four lags of the independent variables.  
 
When observing the results of Table 2, it can be concluded that for the non-
dummy group of variables the estimated parameters are in line with the attributed ranks. 
As expected, the lagged term appears highly significant and is the variable with more 
explanatory power, which is in accordance with high persistence that is associated with 
the sovereign spreads. Economic activity, liquidity and international risk in both 
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methods and models are always significant at 99% proving the key role that these 
factors have in determining the value which markets attribute to the government bonds. 
In terms of the variable that measures competiveness, different estimators give different 
results in terms of statistical significance, where OLS for both models 1 and 2 estimates 
this factor as non-significant, the 2SLS gives for both models statistical significance at 
least at 95% of confidence. Another interesting result is related with the expected fiscal 
position variables, where the expected government’s budget balance in the 2SLS 
estimation is statistically significant, which is in line with the literature on the post 
financial crisis. 
For the dummy variables it is important to point out that for monetary policy, 
not only the sign is in line with the underlying rating (given the positive sign) of the 
events but this variable is also statistically significant, which implies that markets are 
incorporating ECB´s policy decision when pricing the bonds. For the dummy related 
with the EDP procedures the estimated sign was not according with expectations 
given the attributed ranks, since this variable appears with a negative impact which 
means that when it is attributed positive or a negative rank, the estimation is measures 
these ranks in the opposite way. In model (1) of OLS estimator, this variable appears 
statistical significant at 90% of confidence. The 2SLS for both models give an 
unexpected sign to the dummy related with the assessment of the convergence and 
stability programs, but this variable for all models is not statistically significant. 
Finally, for the dummy that captures the events from the financial assistance 
programs, there is a great difference in the results from the different estimations. In 
the OLS estimations this variable is significant at 99% of confidence, where for the 
2SLS models it appears non-significant. 
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Still in the panel estimation, it is done another exercise where is examined the 
prediction power of the sovereign bond market. To conduct this study we have 
introduced lags for the event dummies (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3 – Modeling Sovereign Spreads, Testing Markets Prediction Power  
  OLS   2SLS   
  1 2 1 2 
βit -0.450 -0.547* -1.238** -1.765*** 
 (0.312) (0.304) (0.565) (0.564) 
sprit-1 0.961*** 0.962*** 0.964*** 0.969*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
gindit -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.109*** -0.108*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.029) (0.028) 
qit 0.071 0.091 0.236** 0.348*** 
 (0.067) (0.065) (0.118) (0.120) 
bait 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
balanceit -0.001  -0.006  
 (0.002)  (0.004)  
debtit  0.000  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
vixit 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.060*** 0.063*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.020) (0.018) 
Decbt 0.014** 0.014** 0.047** 0.039* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.022) (0.021) 
Decbt-1 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) 
Dedpit -0.038** -0.039** -0.160 -0.197* 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.114) (0.109) 
Dedpit-1 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.087*** 0.094*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.033) (0.032) 
Dcspit 0.007 0.007 -0.011 0.025 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.092) (0.079) 
Dcspit-1 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.017) 
Dfapit 0.461*** 0.462*** 0.267 0.286 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.200) (0.193) 
Dfapit 0.121* 0.122* 0.137* 0.140* 
 (0.064) (0.065) (0.071) (0.071) 
Ajd-R2 0.979 0.979 0.976 0.975 
N 10 10 10 10 
T 167 167 167 167 
Note: The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. The instrumental variables 
used are the second and third lags of spreads and the first four lags of the independent variables. 
  
 Some important results arise from this exercise. For the events of monetary 
policy it seems that not only the signs are well estimated, and the lag term appears 
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statistically significant at 99% confidence for all models, independently from the 
estimator, which indicates that sovereign spreads anticipate well the future variations 
on the ECB interest rate announcements.  
 Another relevant result is that the lagged event dummies related with the EDP 
and the financial assistance programs appear with the expected sign. For the four 
models, independently from the estimator, they are statistically significant at 90% of 
confidence, which implies the possibility that the sovereign bond market anticipates 
these events. One could speculate that the information that is provided in these events 
is already from public domain, since that, for these particular events there is a lot of 
media cover and monitoring by a variety of different agents. 
5.2 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation 
 In this section we use a different approach for a country-by-country assessment, 
employing a SUR estimation. The idea is to try to capture how the different countries 
react to the different groups of events.  
 The SUR estimation is done by a system of equations enabling that different 
countries can have different coefficients but also that there is a contemporaneous 
correlation between the error terms associated with the individual equations.  
Similar to the equation (1) the following specification was estimated: 
spreadit = β1 + β2spreadt-1 + β3gindt + β4qt + β5bat + β6balancet + β7debtt + β8vixt + 
β9Decbt + β10Dedpt + β11Dcspt + β12Dfapt + ut .     (2) 
The results presented in Table 4, show that the lagged term of the sovereign 
spreads still holds for every country as a fundamental variable. Economic activity only 
appears significant for Finland, France and the Netherlands, but for France the sign of 
the coefficient is not aligned with theory and this variable is only statistically significant 
in one of the models estimated. 
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Moreover, the competitiveness is not affecting the countries that suffered more 
with the crisis, (in this case Greece, Ireland and Portugal) but other sample countries 
since the variable qit is statistically significant at least 10% for countries like Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Italy and the Netherlands. Liquidity factors are only 
explaining sovereign spreads in the case of Belgium, Greece, Italy and Portugal. The 
fiscal position of the sample countries is affecting, as well, a small group of countries. 
Government budget balance seems an important factor in the case of Spain, Greece and 
Ireland which does not came as a surprise since this countries asked for financial 
assistance. Debt-to-GDP as presented in the results from the panel estimations appear 
with a residual role where only Finland and France have statistical significance for this 
variable, but the sign for Finland coefficient is not aligned with theory. International 
risk aversion factors appeared non-significant or in just only one model for the countries 
that received financial help. 
 In terms of the event dummies, the monetary events do not appear significant 
for any of the sample countries. The dummy related with the EDP events appeared 
significant for Belgium, Spain and Italy but once more with the non-expected negative 
sign. The estimated coefficient for the convergence and stability programs assessment 
are generally not significant and in the case of Austria appeared significant at 90% 
confidence, but with the wrong sign. Only for Finland this group of events appears to 
be important. The most interesting results appear from the group of financial assistance 
events, where they appeared significant at 99% of confidence for Spain, Ireland and 
Portugal. 
 For a better understanding of the impact from the event dummies, as it was done 
in the panel estimations, it is conducted an estimation of equation (2) including the lags 
of the event dummies (see Table 5).  
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   The inclusion of the lagged term for the dummy related with the monetary 
events, show that sovereign spreads are in general anticipating this set of events with 
the exception of Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands. In case of Portugal, it seems that 
markets are anticipating these events but attributing an unexpected weight since the 
variable was estimated with a negative sign. For the other set of lagged dummies, they 
are generally not significant.     
5.3. Spillover effects 
 As Afonso et al. (2012) and De Santis (2012) have showed, during the financial 
crisis it seems that there was some contagion effect in the Euro area long-term bond 
market from the lower rated countries that tend to have weaker fiscal positions to the 
high rated countries. In this last exercise, we present some estimation results to 
understand how did the events related with the financial assistance programs impacted 
the Euro area bond market, contributing for a better insight of the channels by which 
this contagion effects propagate. 
 With this idea in mind, the following SUR estimation was used: 
 spreadit = β1 + β2spreadt-1 + β3gindt + β4qt + β5bat + β6balancet + β7debtt + β8vixt + 
β9Decbt + β10Dedpt + β11Dcspt + β12Dfapt + β13DfapESt + β14DfapESt-1 + β14DfapGRt + 
β15DfapGRt-1 + β16DfapIEt + β17DfapIEt-1 + β18DfapPTt + β19DfapPTt-1 + ut.  (3) 
 As Table 6 shows, the events related with Spain seems to affect the financial 
assisted countries plus Italy and France. Interestingly, these events do not have the same 
impact on different countries. Contemporaneously, this has a positive impact on all 
countries for which this dummy is statistically significant, but the lagged term appears 
negative which can be translated as markets speculating possible bad news for Spain. 
Consequently countries that are geographically closer as France or with weaker fiscal 
positions such as Greece and Ireland, where Portugal is affected in both ways.  
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 From the financial assisted countries, Greece’s set of events presents more 
spillover effects. In general, the negative impact of both contemporaneously and lagged 
term has less effect in the countries with stronger fiscal positions such as Austria and 
Finland. 
 In the case of Ireland the spillover effects appeared contemporaneously 
significant and always with negative impact.  
 Finally, sovereign spreads seem to anticipate positively the impact of the review 
missions in Portugal. The number of countries affected contemporaneously by the 
events of the mission in Portugal are fewer and with different impacts. Belgium, Finland 
and France seem to be negatively affected by those events, but for Ireland it is the 
opposite way, by having a positive effect on sovereign spreads.          
 
6. Conclusions 
 In this study we have analyzed the sovereign spreads determinants and how 
monetary and fiscal policy events in the context of European Union economic policy 
affect them. 
 In terms of sovereign spreads determinants, it seems that the liquidity factors, 
competitiveness, economic activity and international risk are the main drivers of 
spreads. The expected fiscal position of countries play a more marginal role, with 
expected budget balance showing more weight, when compared to the debt-to-GDP 
ratio, in shaping market participant’s perception of credit worthiness. 
 The impact from the assembled events in sovereign spreads can be summarized 
as follows. 
  The monetary events play a role in the bond market and they seem to be 
anticipated, which is in line with the findings of Andersson et al. (2009) and Bernoth 
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and Hagen (2004). Events of fiscal policy related with the “arms” of the SGP do not 
have a key role and with some non-expected results for the events assembled for the 
corrective arm of the SGP where markets seem to weight those events in the opposite 
way of the attributed rank. 
When assessing the impact of events related to the financial assistance 
programs, we have found, not only they play a key role in explaining the financial 
assisted countries, but also there is evidence of spillover effects, that have mixed results 
depending on the countries. The overall results is a negative impact from these events 
on the countries that did not asked for financial assistance, and this effect seems to be 
widespread when the events are from the review mission in Greece.   
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Appendix.  
Figure A1 - Events of Preventive Arm from the SGP  
Country Date Description Rank 
Greece 30/09/1998 Commission assesses the Greek convergence programme + 
Finland 30/09/1998 Commission assesses Finland's stability programme + 
Netherlands 25/11/1998 Commission assesses the Dutch stability programme + 
Ireland 12/01/1999 Commission assesses Irish stability programme + 
Austria 12/01/1999 Commission assesses the Austrian stability programme + 
Portugal 03/02/1999 Commission assesses the Portuguese stability programme + 
Italy 03/02/1999 Commission assesses Italy's stability programme # 
France 16/02/1999 Commission assesses the French stability programme + 
Spain 16/02/1999 Commission assesses the Spanish stability programme + 
Belgium 16/02/1999 Commission assesses the Belgian stability programme + 
Netherlands 18/01/2000 Commission assesses the Dutch stability programme + 
Ireland 18/01/2000 Commission assesses Irish stability programme + 
Finland 18/01/2000 Commission assesses Finland's stability programme + 
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Greece 18/01/2000 Commission assesses the Greek convergence programme + 
Spain 15/02/2000 Commission assesses the Spanish stability programme + 
Italy 15/02/2000 Commission assesses Italy's stability programme + 
Belgium 15/02/2000 Commission assesses the Belgian stability programme + 
Portugal 08/03/2000 Commission assesses the Portuguese stability programme + 
France 08/03/2000 Commission assesses the French stability programme + 
Austria 26/04/2000 Commission assesses the Austrian stability programme - 
Finland 15/11/2000 Commission assesses Finland's stability programme + 
Netherlands 15/11/2000 Commission assesses the Dutch stability programme + 
Austria 24/01/2001 Commission assesses the Austrian stability programme + 
Greece 24/01/2001 Commission assesses the Greek Stability programme + 
Italy 24/01/2001 Commission assesses Italy's stability programme + 
France 24/01/2001 Commission assesses the French stability programme + 
Ireland 24/01/2001 Commission assesses Irish stability programme # 
Portugal 28/02/2001 Commission assesses the Portuguese stability programme - 
Spain 28/02/2001 Commission assesses the Spanish stability programme + 
Belgium 28/02/2001 Commission assesses the Belgian stability programme + 
Netherlands 15/01/2002 Commission assesses the Dutch stability programme + 
Finland 15/01/2002 Commission assesses Finland's stability programme + 
Austria 15/01/2002 Commission assesses the Austrian stability programme + 
Belgium 15/01/2002 Commission assesses the Belgian stability programme + 
Portugal 30/01/2002 Commission assesses the Portuguese stability programme - 
Greece 30/01/2002 Commission assesses the Greek stability programme + 
Spain 30/01/2002 Commission assesses the Spanish stability programme + 
Ireland 30/01/2002 Commission assesses Irish stability programme + 
Italy 30/01/2002 Commission assesses Italy's stability programme # 
France 30/01/2002 Commission assesses the French stability programme + 
France 08/01/2003 Commission assesses the French stability programme - 
Finland 08/01/2003 Commission assesses Finland's stability programme + 
Greece 08/01/2003 Commission assesses the Greek Stability programme # 
Italy 08/01/2003 Commission assesses Italy's stability programme - 
Spain 30/01/2003 Commission assesses the Spanish stability programme + 
Ireland 30/01/2003 Commission assesses Irish stability programme + 
Belgium 30/01/2003 Commission assesses the Belgian stability programme + 
Portugal 19/02/2003 Commission assesses the Portuguese stability programme + 
Austria 30/04/2003 Commission assesses the Austrian stability programme # 
Netherlands 24/06/2003 Commission assesses the Dutch stability programme + 
Austria 07/01/2004 Commission assesses the Austrian stability programme # 
Finland 07/01/2004 Commission assesses Finland's stability programme + 
Greece 28/01/2004 Commission assesses the Greek Stability programme # 
Netherlands 28/01/2004 Commission assesses the Dutch stability programme # 
Ireland 28/01/2004 Commission assesses Irish stability programme # 
Italy 28/01/2004 Commission assesses Italy's stability programme # 
France 28/01/2004 Commission assesses the French stability programme # 
Portugal 18/02/2004 Commission assesses the Portuguese stability programme # 
Spain 18/02/2004 Commission assesses the Spanish stability programme # 
Belgium 18/02/2004 Commission assesses the Belgian stability programme # 
Netherlands 11/01/2005 Commission assesses the Dutch stability programme # 
Austria 11/01/2005 Commission assesses the Austrian stability programme - 
Belgium 02/02/2005 Commission assesses the Belgian stability programme + 
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Finland 02/02/2005 Commission assesses Finland's stability programme + 
France 02/02/2005 Commission assesses the French stability programme # 
Ireland 02/02/2005 Commission assesses Irish stability programme + 
Italy 02/02/2005 Commission assesses Italy's stability programme - 
Spain 16/02/2005 Commission assesses the Spanish stability programme + 
Portugal 22/06/2005 Commission assesses the Portuguese stability programme - 
Finland 11/01/2006 Commission assesses Finland's stability programme + 
Belgium 01/02/2006 Commission assesses the Belgian stability programme + 
Austria 01/02/2006 Commission assesses the Austrian stability programme + 
Italy 22/02/2006 Commission assesses Italy's stability programme + 
France 22/02/2006 Commission assesses the French stability programme # 
Greece 22/02/2006 Commission assesses the Greek Stability programme # 
Ireland 22/06/2005 Commission assesses Irish stability programme + 
Netherlands 22/02/2006 Commission assesses the Dutch stability programme + 
Portugal 22/02/2006 Commission assesses the Portuguese stability programme # 
Spain 22/02/2006 Commission assesses the Spanish stability programme + 
France 23/01/2007 Commission assesses the French stability programme + 
Italy 23/01/2007 Commission assesses Italy's stability programme # 
Netherlands 23/01/2007 Commission assesses the Dutch stability programme + 
Finland 07/02/2007 Commission assesses Finland's stability programme + 
Ireland 07/02/2007 Commission assesses Irish stability programme + 
Greece 13/02/2007 Commission assesses the Greek Stability programme + 
Portugal 13/02/2007 Commission assesses the Portuguese stability programme + 
Belgium 07/03/2007 Commission assesses the Belgian stability programme + 
Spain 07/03/2007 Commission assesses the Spanish stability programme + 
Austria 30/05/2007 Commission assesses the Austrian stability programme # 
Finland 23/01/2008 Commission assesses Finland's stability programme + 
Netherlands 23/01/2008 Commission assesses the Dutch stability programme # 
France 30/01/2008 Commission assesses the French stability programme - 
Italy 30/01/2008 Commission assesses Italy's stability programme - 
Austria 13/02/2008 Commission assesses the Austrian stability programme + 
Portugal 13/02/2008 Commission assesses the Portuguese stability programme # 
Ireland 19/02/2008 Commission assesses Irish stability programme # 
Greece 19/02/2008 Commission assesses the Greek Stability programme - 
Spain 19/02/2008 Commission assesses the Spanish stability programme + 
Belgium 11/06/2008 Commission assesses the Belgian stability programme - 
Ireland 18/02/2009 Commission assesses Irish stability programme - 
Greece 18/02/2009 Commission assesses the Greek Stability programme - 
Spain 18/02/2009 Commission assesses the Spanish stability programme - 
France 18/02/2009 Commission assesses the French stability programme - 
Finland 18/02/2009 Commission assesses Finland's stability programme + 
Netherlands 18/02/2009 Commission assesses the Dutch stability programme + 
Italy 25/02/2009 Commission assesses Italy's stability programme # 
Portugal 25/02/2009 Commission assesses the Portuguese stability programme # 
Belgium 24/06/2009 Commission assesses the Belgian stability programme - 
Austria 24/06/2009 Commission assesses the Austrian stability programme # 
Greece 03/02/2010 Commission assesses the Greek Stability programme - 
Belgium 17/03/2010 Commission assesses the Belgian stability programme - 
Ireland 17/03/2010 Commission assesses Irish stability programme - 
Spain 17/03/2010 Commission assesses the Spanish stability programme - 
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France 17/03/2010 Commission assesses the French stability programme - 
Italy 17/03/2010 Commission assesses Italy's stability programme - 
Netherlands 17/03/2010 Commission assesses the Dutch stability programme - 
Austria 17/03/2010 Commission assesses the Austrian stability programme - 
Finland 17/03/2010 Commission assesses Finland's stability programme # 
Portugal 14/04/2010 Commission assesses the Portuguese stability programme # 
Austria 07/06/2011 Commission assesses the Austrian stability programme - 
Belgium 07/06/2011 Commission assesses the Belgian stability programme - 
Finland 07/06/2011 Commission assesses Finland's stability programme + 
France 07/06/2011 Commission assesses the French stability programme - 
Greece 07/06/2011 Commission assesses the Greek Stability programme # 
Spain 07/06/2011 Commission assesses the Spanish stability programme # 
Italy 07/06/2011 Commission assesses Italy's stability programme - 
Netherlands 07/06/2011 Commission assesses the Dutch stability programme - 
Portugal 07/06/2011 Commission assesses the Portuguese stability programme # 
Ireland 07/06/2011 Commission assesses Irish stability programme # 
Belgium 30/05/2012 Commission assesses the Belgian stability programme # 
Ireland 30/05/2012 Commission assesses Irish stability programme # 
Greece 30/05/2012 Commission assesses the Greek Stability programme # 
Spain 30/05/2012 Commission assesses the Spanish stability programme # 
France 30/05/2012 Commission assesses the French stability programme - 
Italy 30/05/2012 Commission assesses Italy's stability programme + 
Netherlands 30/05/2012 Commission assesses the Dutch stability programme - 
Austria 30/05/2012 Commission assesses the Austrian stability programme - 
Portugal 30/05/2012 Commission assesses the Portuguese stability programme # 
Finland 30/05/2012 Commission assesses Finland's stability programme + 
Source: European Commission 
 
 
 
Figure A2 – Events of Corrective Arm from the SGP 
Country Date Description Rank 
Greece 10/11/1999 Commission recommends abrogation of Council decision on the 
existence of an excessive deficit in Greece + 
Portugal 16/10/2002 Commission considers that an excessive government deficit exists 
in Portugal - 
France 19/11/2002 Commission recommends to the Council to address an early 
warning to France - 
France 02/04/2003 Commission adopts report on government finances in France as a 
first step of the Excessive Deficit Procedure - 
France 07/05/2003 Commission considers that an excessive government deficit exists 
in France - 
France 08/10/2003 Commission proceeds with excessive deficit procedure for France - 
Portugal 28/04/2004 Commission recommends abrogation of Council decision on the 
existence of an excessive deficit in Portugal + 
Netherlands 28/04/2004 Commission proposes new steps in budgetary surveillance for 
Netherlands - 
Italy 28/04/2004 Commission proposes new steps in budgetary surveillance for Italy - 
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Netherlands 19/05/2004 Commission recommends further steps under the excessive deficit 
procedure for the Netherlands - 
Greece 19/05/2004 Commission initiates budgetary surveillance for Greece - 
Greece 24/06/2004 Commission recommends further steps under the excessive deficit 
procedure for Greece - 
France 14/12/2004 Commission sees France on track to correct their excessive budget 
deficit + 
Greece 09/02/2005 Commission recommends further steps under the excessive deficit 
procedure for Greece - 
Netherlands 18/05/2005 Commission recommends taking the Netherlands out of the 
excessive deficit procedure + 
Italy 07/06/2005 Commission adopts report on Italian public finances - 
Portugal 22/06/2005 Commission assesses the Portuguese stability programme - 
Italy 29/06/2005 Commission recommends further steps under the excessive deficit 
procedure for Italy - 
Portugal 20/07/2005 Commission recommends further steps under the excessive deficit 
procedure for Portugal - 
Greece 16/05/2007 Commission recommends abrogation of excessive deficit procedure 
for Greece + 
Italy 07/05/2008 Commission recommends abrogation of excessive deficit procedure 
for Italy + 
Portugal 07/05/2008 Commission recommends abrogation of excessive deficit procedure 
for Portugal + 
France 24/03/2009 Commission takes steps under the excessive deficit procedure for 
France - 
Greece 24/03/2009 Commission takes steps under the excessive deficit procedure for 
Greece - 
Ireland 24/03/2009 Commission takes steps under the excessive deficit procedure for 
Ireland - 
Spain 24/03/2009 Commission takes steps under the excessive deficit procedure for 
Spain - 
Finland 23/04/2010 Commission adopts reports under excessive deficit procedure for 
Finland - 
Belgium 15/06/2010 Commission concludes effective action was taken by Belgium in 
excessive deficit procedure + 
Ireland 15/06/2010 Commission concludes effective action was taken by Ireland in 
excessive deficit procedure + 
Spain 15/06/2010 Commission concludes effective action was taken by Spain in 
excessive deficit procedure + 
France 15/06/2010 Commission concludes effective action was taken by France in 
excessive deficit procedure + 
Italy 15/06/2010 Commission concludes effective action was taken by Italy in 
excessive deficit procedure + 
Netherlands 15/06/2010 Commission concludes effective action was taken by Netherland in 
excessive deficit procedure + 
Austria 15/06/2010 Commission concludes effective action was taken by Austria in 
excessive deficit procedure + 
Portugal 15/06/2010 Commission concludes effective action was taken by Portugal in 
excessive deficit procedure + 
Finland 12/05/2010 Commission recommends to open excessive deficit procedure for 
Finland - 
Belgium 11/01/2012 Commission concludes effective action was taken by Belgium in 
excessive deficit procedure + 
Source: European Commission 
 
Figure A3 – Events of Financial Assistance Programs  
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Country Date Description Rank 
Greece 23/04/2010 Joint statement by European Commission, European Central Bank and 
Presidency of the Eurogroup on Greece - 
Greece 05/08/2010 Statement by the EC, ECB, and IMF on the First Review Mission to 
Greece + 
Greece 23/11/2010 Statement by the EC, ECB and IMF on the Second Review Mission to 
Greece + 
Ireland 28/11/2010 European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund have issued a joint 
statement on Ireland on the economic program announced today by 
Ireland.  - 
Greece 24/02/2011 Statement by the EC, ECB and IMF on the Third Review Mission to 
Greece + 
Ireland 15/04/2011 Statement by the EC, ECB, and IMF on the First Review Mission to 
Ireland + 
Portugal 05/05/2011 Statement on Portugal by European Commissioner for Economic and 
Monetary Affairs and Managing Director of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) - 
Greece 03/06/2011 Statement by the European Commission, the ECB and IMF on the Fourth 
Review Mission to Greece + 
Ireland 13/07/2013 Statement by the EC, ECB, and IMF on the Second Review Mission to 
Ireland + 
Portugal 12/08/2011 Statement by the EC, ECB, and IMF on the First Review Mission to 
Portugal + 
Ireland 09/09/2011 Statement by the EC, ECB, and IMF on the Third Review Mission to 
Ireland + 
Portugal 16/11/2011 Statement by the EC, ECB, and IMF on the Second Review Mission to 
Portugal - 
Ireland 19/01/2012 Statement by the EC, ECB, and IMF on the Fourth Review Mission to 
Ireland + 
Portugal 28/02/2012 Statement by the EC, ECB, and IMF on the Third Review Mission to 
Portugal + 
Ireland 26/04/2012 Statement by the EC, ECB, and IMF on the Fifth Review Mission to 
Ireland + 
Portugal 04/06/2012 Statement by the EC, ECB, and IMF on the Fourth Review Mission to 
Portugal + 
Spain 25/06/2012 Spain formally requests financial aid for Spanish banks - 
Ireland 12/07/2012 Statement by the EC, ECB, and IMF on the Sixth Review Mission to 
Ireland + 
Portugal 11/09/2012 Statement by the EC, ECB, and IMF on the Fifth Review Mission to 
Portugal + 
Ireland 25/10/2012 Statement by the EC, ECB, and IMF on the Seventh Review Mission to 
Ireland + 
Spain 26/10/2012 Statement by the EC and the ECB following the conclusion of the first 
review of the financial assistance programme for Spain + 
Portugal 19/11/2012 Statement by the EC, ECB, and IMF on the Sixth Review Mission to 
Portugal + 
Source: European Commission 
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Table 4 – SUR Estimation, the Sovereign Spread Determinants 
  βit sprit-1 gindit qit bait balanceit debtit vixit Decbt Dedpit Dcspit Dfapit Ajd-R2 Obs 
AT 
-2.369*** 0.904*** 0.002 0.470** 0.000 -0.005   0.082*** 0.001 -0.018 -0.029*   
0.924 164 
(0.861) (0.027) (0.009) (0.185) (0.000) (0.004)   (0.020) (0.015) (0.050) (0.017)   
-2.091** 0.898*** 0.000 0.401* 0.000   -0.002 0.092*** 0.004 -0.004 -0.021   
0.923 164 
(0.963) (0.027) (0.009) (0.209) (0.000)   (0.002) (0.021) (0.015) (0.053) (0.018)   
BE 
-2.497** 0.947*** 0.004 0.489** -0.001** -0.005   0.098*** 0.025 -0.088** -0.019   
0.954 167 
(1.044) (0.020) (0.006) (0.222) (0.001) (0.005)   (0.028) (0.020) (0.038) (0.016)   
-2.973** 0.954*** 0.004 0.587** -0.001**   0.000 0.104*** 0.028 -0.098** -0.016   
0.953 167 
(1.316) (0.020) (0.006) (0.283) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.028) (0.020) (0.039) (0.016)   
ES 
-2.197*** 0.966*** 0.01 0.450*** 0.000 -0.010*   0.059 0.008 -0.284*** -0.028 0.233*** 
0.978 167 
(1.482) (0.016) (0.021) (0.312) (0.001) (0.006)   (0.046) (0.031) (0.083) (0.036) (0.078) 
-5.090*** 0.973*** 0.011 1.076 0.000   0.002 0.073 0.015 -0.300*** -0.024 0.226*** 
0.978 167 
(1.836) (0.016) (0.021) (0.406) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.045) (0.031) (0.083) (0.036) (0.078) 
FI 
-0.671** 0.843*** -0.012*** 0.114** 0.000 -0.003   0.066*** 0.004 -0.017 0.017*   
0.929 167 
(0.326) (0.027) (0.004) (0.069) (0.000) (0.002)   (0.013) (0.008) (0.024) (0.010)   
-0.219 0.848*** -0.011*** 0.000 0.000   -0.002** 0.066*** 0.002 -0.014 0.020**   
0.93 167 
(0.398) (0.025) (0.004) (0.090) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.013) (0.008) (0.024) (0.009)   
FR 
-1.493*** 0.936*** 0.016* 0.295** 0.000 0.000   0.052*** 0.003 -0.003 -0.005   
0.941 167 
(0.561) (0.019) (0.008) (0.120) (0.000) (0.002)   (0.018) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012)   
-1.975*** 0.840*** 0.014 0.380*** 0.000   0.001*** 0.070*** -0.001 -0.002 0.001   
0.949 167 
(0.489) (0.025) (0.009) (0.103) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013)   
GR 
5.298 0.864*** -0.112 -1172 0.006*** -0.091*   0.047 -0.059 -0.101 0.185 -0.194 
0.966 167 
(8.942) (0.023) (0.105) (1.911) (0.001) (0.051)   (0.278) (0.214) (0.435) (0.382) (0.475) 
-7.038 0.859*** -0.106 1.336 0.006***   0.013 0.182 0.045 -0.291 0.294 -0.151 
0.966 167 
(7.861) (0.035) (0.105) (1.626) (0.001)   (0.011) (0.292) (0.209) (0.435) (0.381) (0.471) 
IE 
-7.536 0.881*** 0.016 1.700 0.002* -0.033*   -0.11 0.135 -0.276 -0.024 0.623*** 
0.963 85 
(9.201) (0.055) (0.043) (2.024) (0.001) (0.018)   (0.176) (0.118) (0.174) (0.192) (0.297) 
-12.456 0.881*** 0.019 2.731 0.002   0.004 -0.002 0.104 -0.276 0.013 0.611*** 
0.963 85 
(8.753) (0.061) (0.043) (1.938) (0.001)   (0.003) (0.169) (0.117) (0.173) (0.191) (0.296) 
IT 
-2.787** 0.961*** 0.027 0.524* 0.001*** -0.010   0.138*** 0.024 -0.114*** -0.016   
0.972 167 
(1.331) (0.012) (0.021) (0.285) (0.000) (0.009)   (0.046) (0.034) (0.042) (0.032)   
-2.363 0.961*** 0.028 0.455 0.001***   -0.003 0.152*** 0.028 -0.103** -0.011   
0.972 167 
(1.642) (0.011) (0.021) (0.338) (0.000)   (0.003) (0.048) (0.035) (0.041) (0.032)   
NL 
-1.198** 0.866*** -0.006** 0.238** 0.000 -0.002   0.042*** 0.006 0.029* -0.003   
0.922 167 
(0.483) (0.029) (0.003) (0.103) (0.000) (0.003)   (0.012) (0.008) (0.016) (0.011)   
-1.275** 0.873*** -0.006** 0.255** 0.000   0.000 0.041*** 0.006 0.030* 0.000   
0.922 167 
(0.512) (0.024) (0.003) (0.110) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.012) (0.008) (0.017) (0.011)   
PT 
-1.989 0.847*** 0.013 0.362 0.005*** -0.016   0.108 0.022 0.013 0.011 0.343*** 
0.993 167 
(3.425) (0.014) (0.021) (0.743) (0.000) (0.020)   (0.057) (0.044) (0.071) (0.075) (0.080) 
-2.877 0.838*** 0.007 0.559 0.005***   0.003 0.110* 0.024 0.018 0.008 0.342*** 
0.993 167 
(2.973) (0.021) (0.021) (0.641) (0.000)   (0.004) (0.057) (0.044) (0.070) (0.074) (0.079) 
Note: The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively.  
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Table 5 – SUR Estimation, Markets Prediction Power 
  β it sprit-1 gindit qit bait balanceit debtit vixit Decbt Decbt-1 Dedpit Dedpit-1 Dcspit Dcspit-1 Dfapit Dfapit-1 Ajd-R2 obs 
AT 
-2.307*** 0.906*** 0.003 0.458** 0.000 -0.008*   0.080*** 0.000 0.005 -0.029 0.055 -0.029* -0.022     
0.925 164 
(0.858) (0.028) (0.009) (0.184) (0.000) (0.004)   (0.021) (0.015) (0.014) (0.054) (0.053) (0.017) (0.016)     
-1.890** 0.907*** 0.000 0.356* 0.000   -0.002 0.093*** 0.004 0.010 -0.011 0.062 -0.019 -0.021     
0.924 164 
(0.963) (0.027) (0.009) (0.208) (0.000)   (0.002) (0.021) (0.015) (0.014) (0.056) (0.055) (0.018) (0.016)     
BE 
-3.079*** 0.977*** 0.002 0.599*** -0.001** 0.000   0.118*** 0.028 0.062*** -0.063 0.149*** -0.020 -0.012     
0.959 167 
(1.001) (0.022) (0.006) (0.211) (0.001) (0.006)   (0.027) (0.019) (0.018) (0.042) (0.043) (0.017) (0.016)     
-3.118** 0.976*** 0.001 0.607** -0.001**   0.000 0.118*** 0.028 0.063*** -0.074* 0.144*** -0.018 -0.011     
0.959 167 
(1.300) (0.021) (0.006) (0.279) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.027) (0.019) (0.018) (0.044) (0.044) (0.017) (0.017)     
ES 
-2.478* 0.968*** 0.009 0.498 0.000 -0.010   0.077 0.010 0.054* -0.290*** -0.016 -0.024 0.021 0.233*** 0.146* 
0.978 167 
(1.483) (0.017) (0.022) (0.311) (0.001) (0.006)   (0.047) (0.031) (0.030) (0.086) (0.083) (0.036) (0.037) (0.077) (0.079) 
-5.230*** 0.975*** 0.012 1.092*** 0.000   0.002 0.094** 0.016 0.063* -0.309*** -0.018 -0.019 0.026 0.230*** 0.114 
0.978 167 
(1.858) (0.016) (0.022) (0.410) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.045) (0.031) (0.030) (0.086) (0.083) (0.036) (0.037) (0.078) (0.080) 
FI 
-0.725** 0.865*** -0.013*** 0.124* 0.000 -0.003   0.066*** 0.005 0.016* 0.013 -0.053* 0.019** -0.001     
0.931 167 
(0.323) (0.028) (0.004) (0.069) (0.000) (0.002)   (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.028) (0.029) (0.010) (0.010)     
-0.261 0.864*** -0.011** 0.009 0.000   -0.002** 0.066*** 0.002 0.013 0.013 -0.050* 0.022** 0.001     
0.932 167 
(0.413) (0.026) (0.004) (0.093) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.028) (0.029) (0.010) (0.010)     
FR 
-1.657*** 0.950*** 0.015* 0.326*** 0.000 0.001   0.059*** 0.003 0.026** -0.003 0.008 -0.004 0.000     
0.941 167 
(0.572) (0.021) (0.009) (0.122) (0.000) (0.002)   (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.035) (0.012) (0.012)     
-1.934*** 0.848*** 0.013 0.368*** 0.000   0.001*** 0.074*** -0.003 0.019* -0.003 0.007 0.004 0.008     
0.950 167 
(0.490) (0.027) (0.009) (0.103) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.035) (0.013) (0.013)     
GR 
9.168 0.854*** -0.112 -1.938 0.007*** -0.116**   -0.069 -0.073 -0.265 0.047 -0.121 0.116 0.063 -0.102 0.298 
0.965 167 
(9.480) (0.024) (0.109) (2.013) (0.001) (0.055)   (0.291) (0.215) (0.215) (0.493) (0.492) (0.388) (0.393) (0.441) (0.447) 
-6.087 0.863*** -0.095 1.185 0.006***   0.011 0.123 0.052 -0.106 -0.106 -0.159 0.227 0.119 0.029 0.406 
0.965 167 
(8.176) (0.035) (0.110) (1.685) (0.001)   (0.012) (0.304) (0.211) (0.205) (0.496) (0.497) (0.392) (0.394) (0.448) (0.458) 
IE 
-5.999 0.893*** 0.029 1.359 0.002** -0.027   -0.090 0.130 -0.045 -0.288 -0.146 0.021 0.013 0.635*** 0.421*** 
0.965 85 
(9.047) (0.054) (0.042) (1.995) (0.001) (0.018)   (0.176) (0.120) (0.110) (0.297) (0.291) (0.184) (0.190) (0.171) (0.162) 
-10.498 0.890*** 0.031 2.318 0.002*   0.004 -0.021 0.116 -0.064 -0.264 -0.129 0.040 0.032 0.645*** 0.424*** 
0.965 85 
(8.560) (0.059) (0.042) (1.897) (0.001)   (0.003) (0.174) (0.119) (0.108) (0.294) (0.289) (0.183) (0.189) (0.169) (0.162) 
IT 
-3.027** 0.966*** 0.031 0.564* 0.001*** -0.007   0.156*** 0.021 0.062* -0.121** -0.004 -0.013 0.019     
0.972 167 
(1.365) (0.012) (0.024) (0.291) (0.000) (0.010)   (0.047) (0.034) (0.033) (0.047) (0.047) (0.036) (0.036)     
-2.207 0.967*** 0.034 0.411 0.001**   -0.004 0.172*** 0.024 0.067** -0.110** -0.009 -0.007 0.024     
0.972 167 
(1.700) (0.012) (0.023) (0.348) (0.000)   (0.004) (0.049) (0.034) (0.033) (0.047) (0.047) (0.036) (0.036)     
NL 
-1.181** 0.875*** -0.006* 0.234** 0.000 -0.001   0.041*** 0.006 0.004 0.027 0.015 -0.004 0.004     
0.922 167 
(0.479) (0.030) (0.003) (0.103) (0.000) (0.003)   (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011)     
-1.167** 0.878*** -0.005* 0.231** 0.000   0.000 0.040*** 0.005 0.004 0.027 0.017 -0.002 0.004     
0.922 167 
(0.511) (0.025) (0.003) (0.110) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011)     
PT 
0.305 0.826*** 0.013 -0.117 0.006*** -0.032*   0.073 0.021 -0.084** 0.026 0.093 0.029 0.010 0.299*** -0.039 
0.993 167 
(3.442) (0.015) (0.020) (0.745) (0.000) (0.019)   (0.057) (0.043) (0.042) (0.068) (0.068) (0.071) (0.071) (0.078) (0.077) 
-2.474 0.821*** 0.006 0.494 0.006***   0.003 0.078 0.029 -0.073* 0.029 0.098 0.018 0.010 0.301*** -0.041 
0.993 167 
(2.983) (0.021) (0.020) (0.642) (0.000)   (0.004) (0.058) (0.043) (0.042) (0.068) (0.069) (0.071) (0.071) (0.078) (0.077) 
Note: The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively. 
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Table 6 – SUR Estimation, Contagion Effects 
  DfapESt DfapESt-1 DfapGRt DfapGRt-1 DfapIEt DfapIEt-1 DfapPTt DfapPTt-1 Ajd-R2 obs 
AT 
-0.016 -0.069 -0.059** -0.102*** -0.122*** 0.018 -0.035 0.053* 0.935 164 
(0.059) (0.060) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)     
-0.015 -0.076 -0.061* -0.106*** -0.123*** 0.017 -0.033 0.051* 0.934 164 
(0.059) (0.060) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)     
BE 
-0.024 -0.047 -0.070* -0.224*** -0.051 -0.098*** -0.124*** 0.099*** 0.970 167 
(0.070) (0.071) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038)     
-0.016 -0.042 -0.072* -0.226*** -0.055 -0.104*** -0.130*** 0.093** 0.970 167 
(0.069) (0.070) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)     
ES 
    -0.068 -0.216*** -0.282*** -0.064 0.013 0.153** 0.981 167 
    (0.071)  (0.070) (0.071) (0.069) (0.073) (0.072)     
    -0.072 -0.217*** -0.284*** -0.065 0.005 0.138* 0.981 167 
    (0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.069) (0.072) (0.072)     
FI 
-0.045 -0.018 0.006 -0.042** 0.017 -0.001 -0.058*** 0.037** 0.940 167 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)     
-0.038 -0.025 0.000 -0.047*** 0.012 -0.005 -0.060*** 0.033** 0.940 167 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)     
FR 
-0.049 -0.114** -0.079*** -0.113*** -0.086*** -0.038 -0.049* 0.064** 0.952 167 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)     
-0.028 -0.094* -0.064** -0.102*** -0.080*** -0.037 -0.050* 0.061** 0.955 167 
(0.050) (0.051) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)     
GR 
2.028*** 1.299*     -1.563*** -1.877*** 0.447 2.623*** 0.976 167 
(0.734) (0.766)     (0.421) (0.413) (0.412) (0.418)     
2.079*** 2.150***     -1.499*** -1.973*** 0.383 2.693*** 0.977 167 
(0.732) (0.826)     (0.418) (0.415) (0.413) (0.412)     
IE 
0.609** -0.662** -0.348** -0.550***     0.831*** 0.239 0.977 85 
(0.279) (0.294) (0.176) (0.165)     (0.151) (0.147)     
0.668** -0.592** -0.369** -0.587***     0.859*** 0.308** 0.978 85 
(0.271) (0.287) (0.169) (0.160)     (0.145) (0.146)     
IT 
0.459*** -0.049 -0.177*** -0.329*** -0.517*** -0.156** -0.073 0.003 0.98 167 
(0.128) (0.130) (0.069) (0.069) (0.072) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070)     
0.463*** -0.055 -0.181*** -0.335*** -0.512*** -0.158** -0.079 -0.008 0.98 167 
(0.128) (0.131) (0.069) (0.069) (0.073) (0.069) (0.070) (0.071)     
NL 
0.059* -0.046 -0.020 -0.021 -0.072*** -0.010 -0.019 0.037** 0.928 167 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)     
0.060 -0.046 -0.020 -0.021 -0.073*** -0.010 -0.019 0.037 0.928 167 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)     
PT 
0.515*** -0.655*** -0.173* -0.214** -0.569*** -0.045     0.994 167 
(0.171) (0.175) (0.096) (0.095) (0.101) (0.099)         
0.512*** -0.697*** -0.162* -0.204** -0.557*** -0.029     0.994 167 
(0.174) (0.178) (0.097) (0.097) (0.102) (0.100)         
Note: The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively
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